Proponents of accelerated EU enlargement argue that granting candidate countries in the Western Balkans full membership within five years would strengthen the rule of law in those countries. Their reasoning is that membership conditionality—the requirement to meet Copenhagen Criteria—has historically been the single most effective lever for judicial and anti-corruption reform in candidate countries, and that prolonging candidate status reduces that leverage as domestic reform fatigue sets in.
Which of the following, if true, most weakens the proponents' argument?
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Explicación
The proponents claim accelerated membership strengthens rule of law. Choice A directly undermines this by showing that post-accession removal of conditionality pressure has historically reversed the very reforms the argument credits to that pressure—accelerating membership would thus accelerate the removal of leverage. Choice B is a 'close miss': independent reform momentum slightly weakens the necessity of the conditionality lever but does not undermine the core claim about membership strengthening rule of law. Choice C is irrelevant—civil-society support for membership does not bear on whether membership delivers rule-of-law gains. Choice D weakens a different part of the argument (feasibility of meeting criteria) rather than the rule-of-law claim. Choice E actually supports the proponents by suggesting costs of delay.
